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RECONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE: A REBUTTAL
JERRY K. BEATTY*
INTRODUCTION
I welcome Mr. Schneider's thoughtful comments on my article. In
his critique, the author draws two conclusions which are of particular
interest. The original article was presented as "an effort to determine
the magnitude of state court evasion of Court mandates."' Mr. Schnei-
der feels this goal was not accomplished because of an "unrealistically
restricted" definition of evasion.
The author also questions the study's finding "that most state
courts of last resort have an admirable record of compliance." ' It is Mr.
Schneider's view that state court evasion of Supreme Court mandates
is a "rather widespread" practice.
The criticisms noted above suggest that the conclusions one reaches
in a study of this type will greatly depend on how the term "evasion" is
defined. The remainder of this rebuttal, therefore, will be devoted to a
delineation of the criteria for evasion used in my original study, followed
by a discussion of the rationale behind the criteria so employed.
STATE COURT EVASION DEFINED
Initially it should be noted that my study took cognizance of var-
ious strategems by which state courts may evade the letter or intent of
a Supreme Court mandate. It was recognized that state courts may: (1)
construe the state law to conform with minimal constitutional stan-
dards, (2) narrowly interpret the dictum of Supreme Court precedents,
(3) require precisely parallel fact situations, (4) refuse to expand logi-
cally the rulings of the High Court to closely related areas, and (5)
decline to permit an appeal because of a violation of procedural rules.3
For purposes of the study, however, genuine state court evasion was
restricted to instances in which the United States Supreme Court twice
accepted an appeal, issued a mandate, and overruled a judgment of a
state supreme court.' As an additional safeguard, a finding of evasion
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Simpson College.
1. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During the Last
Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260, 285 (1972).
2. Id. at 284.
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was conditioned upon the clarity of the Supreme Court's original man-
date.'
A slightly less rigorous definition of quasi-evasion was employed
to classify state decisions in which
at least one state court justice and this writer discovered mean-
ingful discrepancies between the Supreme Court mandate and
the subsequent state court decision. While, unlike the evasion
decisions, the Supreme Court never considered these cases
again following the initial remands, these adverse state court
decisions at least suggest less than full compliance with the
Supreme Court's implicit directions.'
Since the Supreme Court did not later reverse these decisions, they were
not categorized as truly evasive.
As noted earlier, state courts have several methods available by
which they may ignore, delay, deviate from, or give only partial compli-
ance to mandates of the United States Supreme Court. The purpose of
the study, however, was to focus on instances where evasion was clear
and intentional. Consequently, evasion was found only when a seem-
ingly unambiguous Supreme Court mandate was evaded directly and
deliberately by the state supreme court and the High Court remedied
the evasion in a subsequent review.
RATIONALE OF DEFINITION ADOPTED
Regardless of the definition of evasion one employs, it seems clear
that a certain amount of subjectivity will necessarily be involved in its
application. This factor is naturally magnified as the definition becomes
more expansive and encompassing. Consequently, the definition de-
scribed above is based on the premise that the validity of a study is
enhanced when this element is kept within reasonable bounds. Mr.
Schneider is, therefore, correct when he observes that the definition does
not include the actions of "state courts not directly involved in the
litigation." Furthermore, it is instructive to note that even when the
Supreme Court accepts a state case and reverses and remands or vacates
and remands, deliberate evasion is not necessarily indicated.
Cases may be remanded for a number of reasons. Many are re-
versed because the state court failed to provide a fair trial, refused to
rule on constitutional issues raised, or was ambiguous in its interpreta-
5. Id.
6. Id. at 275 (footnotes omitted).
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tion. Frequently a case will be remanded for a new trial on the merits,
or the Court may instruct the state court to hear the case again, taking
into account supervening state legislation. Moreover, issues presented
in the second trial may differ substantially from those originating from
the initial appeal. With the facts and legal issues already shaped by
lower court judges, the Supreme Court usually returns most cases to the
state courts for final disposition. It should also be noted that the vague
remand formula, "proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," gives
state court judges significant discretion.
While I agree that a more inclusive study of state court deviation
is long overdue, I am not convinced that my "restrictive" view of eva-
sion is "unrealistic." When making a charge of clear and deliberate
evasion, I would rather rely upon criteria based upon the direct review
of state court decisions by the nine Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court than the more subjective interpretations of lay judges using
varying definitions of "evasion." Granted, other instances of delay and
noncompliance may occur; but lacking the concrete empirical data of
direct Supreme Court review or interview data, deliberate evasion will
be difficult to substantiate. Rarely are Supreme Court decisions so
precise and unequivocal that all reasonable judges can agree as to their
interpretation and application.
My original conclusion that most state supreme courts have an
"admirable" record of compliance is best defended by citing my own
findings. Research indicated that while the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded or vacated and remanded 337 of the 560 state court cases
decided by it during the last decade of the Warren Court, in only 54 of
the 199 cases resulting in further litigation did the Court remand fail to
reverse the state court decision.' Most importantly, in only eight of the
560 cases (1.4 percent) did the Court feel compelled to correct the state
court for refusing to comply with its initial command.'
CONCLUSION
I would like to commend Mr. Schneider for presenting an excellent
statement of an important gap in judicial research. I agree that if we
desire to learn the full scope of state court deviation it will be necessary
to compare and contrast each and every decision of the state courts with
those handed down by the Supreme Court. Ideally, the aggregate data
should be supplemented with information derived from personal inter-
7. Id. at 262.
8. Id. at 285.
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views in which state and federal judges would be asked to explain the
lack of uniformity.
It is clear that only through careful measurement of the many
variables which influence judicial decision-making can we conclude au-
thoritatively that a specific state court action represents an intentional
defiance of a clear and definite Supreme Court mandate. This is the task
for future research.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1973], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss2/4
ualparaiso niuer it Neuie
Volume 7 Winter 1973 Number 2
BOARD OF EDITORS
JOHN R. STOLLER
Editor-in-Chief
THOMAS H. NELSON
Articles and Book Reviews
Editor
LEONARD M. HOLAJTER
Executive Editor
GARY S. GERMANN
Note Editor
JAMES H. NASH
Note Editor
FRANKLIN E. MISNER
Note Editor
WILLIAM E. ALEXA
Managing Editor
LARRY W. HOFREITER
Associate Editor
FACULTY ADVISOR
JACK A. HILLER
CANDIDATES
RICHARD A. BERMAN
JAMES A. CHESLEK
CRAIG A. HANSON
EUGENE H. HENNIG
JOHN D. HENRY
THOMAS C. HILL
JOHN F. HOEHNER
DAVID L. HOLLENBECK
JAMES L. JORGENSEN
ALFRED Y. KIRKLAND
WILLIAM P. KRATZKE
KENNETH A. MANNING
ROGER H. SEIBERT
Published by Valparaiso University School of Law, Valparaiso, Indiana.
CLETUS F. EPPLE
Articles and Projects
Editor
Beatty: Reconsideration of the Evidence: A Rebuttal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1973], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss2/4
